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A VERY NEW LAWYER'S FIRST CASE: 
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
John J. Cound* 
They asked the FBI three times to find me that mid-August 
weekend in 1953. They couldn't do it. Maybe I should have 
held up a bank or two. They turned the job over to the Harvard 
Law School grapevine, and within two hours I had a telegram 
from my fiancee telling me to call a Philip Elman. 
I was a year out of law school and had just completed a 
wonderful clerkship in New York with Learned Hand. I was on 
vacation, a job with the Department of Justice to begin Septem-
ber 15. When I called Elman, he said that Justice was forming a 
group to brief the reargument in the School Segregation Cases. 
Could I come to work immediately? I reported on Monday and 
began my first case. 
The Segregation Cases were five lawsuits involving segre-
gated schools in Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, 
and the District of Columbia. The thrust of plaintiffs' claims 
was no longer for equal schools- for better schools-but for the 
same schools, for a decision that law-enforced segregation of 
primary and secondary public schools violated the Constitution 
of the United States. The principle had been established for 
graduate and professional schools. The NAACP, in a carefully 
planned campaign, was now extending its challenge to the lower 
grades. The focus of the case was aided by a finding in the Kan-
sas district court that the black and white schools of Topeka 
were physically, and in all other respects, equal. In the other 
four areas black schools were clearly unequal; in D.C., South 
Carolina, and Virginia, federal courts had given the states time 
to build new schools. Interestingly, it was only the state courts 
of Delaware that, while finding that U.S. Supreme Court prece-
dent allowed separate but equal treatment, nevertheless ordered 
the immediate admission of black children to white schools, 
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pending efforts to bring the black schools up to equality. The 
right of the children, the Delaware court said, was personal.1 
The five cases had been argued in December of 1952, but in 
June 1953 reargument was ordered, with directions "to discuss 
particularly five questions." 
The first two questions dealt with the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Was there an intention or understanding of 
Congress, or of the state legislatures which ratified the Four-
teenth Amendment, with respect to segregation in the public 
schools? 
The last two questions, perhaps critical to the Court's even-
tual conclusion, asked whether the Court, if it found a constitu-
tional violation, might allow a gradual adjustment. 
The third question asked whether, if the legislative history 
provided no answer, it was "within the judicial power, in con-
struing the Amendment, to abolish segregation in public 
schools"? 
It was this third question I was asked to brief. The "team" 
consisted of Philip Elman, a member of the Solicitor General's 
office, who had handled most of the Government's civil rights 
work, and four other lawyers, two from Alien Property, one 
from Antitrust and one from Tax. They were all experienced 
lawyers. Only I was brand-new. Within the Department overall 
responsibility for the project lay with the Assistant Attorney 
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, Lee Rankin, an excel-
lent Nebraska lawyer with no experience in constitutional law. 
Eisenhower had not yet named a Solicitor General. One conse-
quence of that vacancy provided me with the biggest office I will 
ever have. All the other team members were established law-
yers in the Department; they had offices. I was given the S.G.'s 
office, about the size of a basketball court with its own bath. I 
felt like a beetle in the Temple of Karnak. I found a tiny room 
over the secretary's office, which Justice Reed had put in for 
himself when he was S.G. There I prepared the Government's 
answer to Question 3. 
Writing a vigorous argument that it was indeed "within the 
judicial power, in construing the Amendment, to abolish segre-
gation in the public schools" I found myself reflecting that this 
was a slant quite different from the lessons I had learned during 
the preceding year from America's stoutest exponent of judicial 
1. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (1952). 
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restraint. I was still answering some questions from the Judge 
about a complex case on which I had worked. In a letter I com-
mented that my present task entailed a view of judicial power 
quite different from the one he had so recently imparted to me. 
I received a quick reply, in which he said, "I am sorry if anything 
I have said to you is troubling you in your new work." I as-
sumed he was simply telling me to do my job-Hand was a char-
ter member of Holmes's Society of Jobbists and regarded 
craftsmanlike performance as man's closest approach to mean-
ing. But I have always wondered whether he was also telling me 
that he would have had little philosophical problem with this 
one. 
I had been picked for the team because I had a strong law 
school record, and, most important, I was available. I was cer-
tainly not selected because of any track record on the issue. My 
views on segregation were hardly militant. Until law school, I 
had never attended an integrated school. Two years in Louisi-
ana, one year in Virginia, and nine years in the District of Co-
lumbia schools. Four years at all-white George Washington 
University. Harvard Law School had a few African-American 
students, but I think there were none in my class of 1952. I 
hadn't thought much about the question until Law School. I had 
frequently in the previous year discussed the issue with Gus 
Hand's law clerk, a good friend from law school. I think Harry 
Thayer descended from Massachusetts abolitionists, and he had 
no doubts about the proper answer. Ironically, after the clerk-
ships my next meeting with Harry was at the Supreme Court 
during the December oral arguments. He had gone with Davis, 
Polk in New York, and his first assignment-with which he was 
distinctly not pleased-was to the South Carolina brief. 
I favored integration as a policy, although I was undecided 
on the constitutional question. I had three reasons for my 
judgment on policy. First, I could not see any good reason for 
segregation. Why shouldn't blacks and whites go to school to-
gether? Second, it seemed economically dumb. As a Virginia 
taxpayer, I thought running one school system was hard enough. 
Why two? Third, separate-but-equal was a myth; it had never 
existed anywhere with which I was familiar. In Washington, 
D.C. and Arlington, Virginia, the systems were not even close. 
The 1951 dissenting opinion of Henry Edgerton in the D.C. Cir-
cuit case of Carr v Cominl demonstrates that there had been 
2. 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
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not the slightest attempt to maintain equal schools. (There had 
been a controversy among the black civil rights lawyers about 
Carr, those who wanted segregation banned outright were op-
posed to litigating a case which so clearly invited an order to 
equalize.) Maybe segregation was not per se unconstitutional, 
but I was authoritarian enough in my legal attitudes that I could 
not accept ignoring the separate-only-if-equal mandate. A view 
that the Southern states had forfeited any claim to run separate 
schools made my conversion to the constitutional position easy. 
I have briefed more difficult issues in less important cases. 
Ironically the precedent most difficult to distinguish was an 1899 
opinion by Justice Harlan,3 who had dissented from the sepa-
rate-and equal doctrine in Plessy and insisted that the Constitu-
tion is color-blind. The Court permitted the operation of a 
white high school when no similar school for blacks was pro-
vided. Standing by itself, the case clearly does not sit easily with 
Brown. But the Supreme Court had in enough subsequent cases 
found an obligation of at-least-equality to render the 1899 deci-
sion a sport. The argument made in the early '50s by the South-
em states that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to 
education had clearly been rejected decades before. 
The briefing of Question Three took about three weeks. 
Just about the time it was finished, we learned of the sudden 
death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson. Much has been written 
about the significance of this event to the eventual outcome. 
Justice Frankfurter is frequently quoted as saying that "This is 
the first solid piece of evidence I've ever had that there really is 
a God." At the time no one expressed such a sentiment to me. 
Perhaps that shows how low on the totem pole I was. Vinson is 
said to have been opposed to overruling Plessy: A sure vote 
against. I think two comments on Vinson are appropriate: Vin-
son marshaled the unanimous Courts for the decisions in 
McLaurin4 and Sweatt5 -the Oklahoma and Texas law school 
cases-and in Shelley v. Kraemer,6 which many scholars in the 
'50s regarded as the toughest of them all. Second, Earl Warren 
was certainly a positive accession. 
I was then assigned to join the others who were researching 
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, and spent 
about eight weeks in the Library of Congress. The Congres-
3. Cumming v. Board of Education,115 U.S. 528 (1899). 
4. McLaurin v. Oklahomtl State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
5. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
6. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
1998] A LAWYER'S FIRST CASE 61 
sional history had been finished, but we now engaged in a state-
by-state examination. We looked at the governors' addresses, 
the legislative journals, and the few committee reports. We 
went page by page through newspapers covering the entire leg-
islative session. We looked into memoirs and current histories. 
It was fascinating, but it was not very revealing on our questions. 
You will note that I did not mention legislative debates. In 1866 
only two states reported debates: Pennsylvania in full, Indiana in 
digest. (This was incidentally still the case in 1953.) It is fre-
quently said that there is nothing in the records about schools 
and segregation (often attributed to the fact that many states 
had no public education for anybody at the time). But there is a 
single mention in each of the two states for whom we have a re-
cord of debates. In Pennsylvania the mention was by a sup-
porter of the Amendment. In Indiana it was an opponent who 
threatened, "Pass this amendment, and your children will go to 
school with black children." 
Our conclusion was "in sum, while the legislative history 
does not conclusively establish that the Congress which pro-
posed the Fourteenth Amendment specifically understood that 
it would abolish racial segregation in the public schools, there is 
ample evidence that it did understand that the Amendment es-
tablished the broad constitutional principle of full and complete 
equality of all persons under the law, and that it forbade all legal 
distinctions based on race and color." 
Incidentally, one thing which research showed was that 
there was a time in this country when party loyalty meant some-
thing. In all the non-secessionist states, no Republican legislator 
voted against ratification; only one Democrat voted in favor. As 
a Republican in 1953, I was rather proud of that. 
We were informed by Elman the day the brief went to the 
Court that Rankin had told him that Attorney General Brownell 
had taken the brief to the White House and that the President 
had approved. 
I now began my regular assignment in the Appellate Sec-
tion of the Civil Division. But when the oral arguments took 
place I was privileged to sit with counsel. Indeed I was lucky 
enough to sit immediately behind Thurgood Marshall and Jack 
Greenberg. When you have been immersed for a dozen weeks 
on a legal matter, listening to about fifteen hours of argument is 
interesting, but not very exciting. It is unlikely that anything 
new or startling will occur. There was one stir. Late on the sec-
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ond afternoon, the case from the District of Columbia was be-
gun. The question quickly arose whether the Corporation 
Counsel continued to represent the School Board. Congress had 
never ordered segregation in the D.C. schools; it had simply 
made separate appropriations for what were designated Division 
One (white) and Division Two (black) schools. Less than two 
weeks before the arguments the School Board made noises 
about itself integrating the D.C. schools. There were questions 
from the Court, but nothing came of it. I thought the Court was 
not prepared to let the strongest case for integration -the na-
tion's capital-pass out of its reach. My chief memory of the 
episode came on the third morning, when John W. Davis came 
over to Thurgood Marshall and smilingly showed him a telegram 
"from Governor Byrnes saying that I do represent the state of 
South Carolina." 
The arguments on the whole were solid. A few impressions 
remain. The very courtly Attorney General of Delaware, Hol-
lywood's image of a Supreme Court advocate. Thurgood Mar-
shall's forceful dignity. John W. Davis, over 80, in the last of a 
hundred and forty arguments he made before the Court, was not 
as impressive. The few questions addressed to him by the Jus-
tices seemed to reflect a sense that his responses would not be 
too helpful. (I was told by my later boss in the Department that 
during the arguments in the Steel Seizure Cases two years be-
fore, virtually no questions were addressed to Davis arguing for 
the steel companies, while a young lawyer making the same ar-
guments for the Locomotive Engineers was subjected to what 
the boss described as "the most merciless questioning I have 
ever heard in the Court."). My favorite of the lawyers was 
James Nabrit representing the black students in the District of 
Columbia case. He was a master of the "I'm only a simple coun-
try lawyer" approach, although he had an extensive urban prac-
tice. He phrased many of his arguments as humble suggestions, 
while, as a colleague phrased it, "firing greased curveballs past 
the court." I was happy to read Richard Kluger conclude in his 
book Simple Justice, that Nabrit had "provided the Negro side 
with its most memorable moment of oratory."7 Nabrit died in 
December 1997; I thought the press might have been more at-
tentive to his passing. 
One other part of the argument is unforgettable. During an 
afternoon when the tremendous significance of the occasion be-
7. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 676 (Knopf, 1975). 
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gan to be challenged by the dim light and warm air of the court-
room, I was glad to see that mine was not the only attention that 
needed reinforcement. Attorney General Lindsay Almond of 
Virginia was speaking, and was using the tidewater pronuncia-
tion of "nigra." Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg sat in 
the chairs immediately in front of me, carefully paying atten-
tion- to see if Almond slipped into a more opprobrious word. I 
remember Marshall whispering, "There he almost said it," 
"That's closer," and finally "There, he did it!" 
I doubt the oral arguments affected any vote. They rarely 
do in the most important cases. But it was hard to observe the 
quality, the integrity, and the dedication of the NAACP lawyers 
without feeling that a system that separated them from the rest 
of us was terribly wrong. That, I think, was the most important 
contribution of the argument sessions. 
The Government's brief argued that if the Court struck 
down segregation it could order a gradual implementation. The 
Government had proposed this in 1952 as well. Philip Elman in 
an oral archive8 asserts that this was a necessary concession if 
some Justices were to be persuaded; it was, he thought, the key 
to a unanimous opinion. The NAACP argued that a remedy 
must issue "forthwith." When the Court in May 1954 came 
down with its opinion declaring school segregation unconstitu-
tional, it ordered another reargument on the remedy. I was 
vaguely troubled at the time at the delay. The District of Co-
lumbia board immediately announced integration for the Fall of 
1954. I am glad that George Washington University, though a 
private institution, made the same decision. But it seemed that 
the Southern states simply took the time to dig deeper. I did not 
play any part in the work on the new brief. When the Court in 
May 1955 announced that integration should proceed "with all 
deliberate speed," I told a colleague that I was reminded of the 
story of the young lady who told her boyfriend, "I will give you 
just one-half hour to take your hand off my knee." 
The Government's position, in my view, was justified only if 
it was necessary to a majority. I have always believed that una-
nimity was an overrated concern. From McCulloch v. Maryland 
to Roe v. Wade, many of the Court's most important decisions 
have been split. Many unanimous decisions have stirred signifi-
cant opposition. It is not to be expected, I believe, that experi-
8. P. Elman and N. Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and 
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-60: An Oral History, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1987). 
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enced and highly intelligent men and women will easily reach 
unanimity on propositions more controversial than a geometry 
theorem. The Court again was unanimous in ordering integra-
tion of Little Rock Central High School in 1957; indeed in an 
unusual gesture the opinion was issued in the name of each jus-
tice. It took the United States Army to enforce that one. Inci-
dentally I believe that the President's action and the soldier's 
bayonets were accepted by the nation because it was the law and 
the law must be obeyed. I wonder whether that argument would 
carry so well today? 
I make no pretense to having played a significant part in 
this great case. I can look at the brief and see that I wrote a very 
important section of it; my contribution to the historical appen-
dix is a substantial part of the best legislative history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ever compiled. But I know that if I had 
not been there the brief and the history would have looked 
much the same, and the result of the case would certainly not 
have changed. I was no part of strategic or tactical choices, nor 
the origin of any brilliant insight. I did a lawyer's job; I am glad 
we won, and I am proud to have been there. Agincourt would 
have been won had any single English archer been abed upon St. 
Crispian's day, but Henry V told the happy few that each would 
be remembered. When I sat in the court on that second after-
noon in the subdued December light and was simultaneously 
bored and thrilled, there crossed my mind the motto of my high 
school-the now-most-integrated high school in the city of 
Washington. The motto, from Virgil: Haec 0/im Meminisse Ju-
vabit. In times to come it may please us to remember this. It 
pleases me to remember those days. 
